#ONE CLICK POLITICS TRIAL#

Prof Trish Greenhalgh, of the University of Oxford, said the report hinted at a вЂњless than healthy relationshipвЂќ between government and its scientific advisory bodies. The problem was compounded, the report adds, by the failure of public bodies to share data, including between national and local government.ДЇurther criticism is levelled at poor protection in care homes, for black, Asian and minority ethnic groups and for people with learning disabilities. When the test, trace and isolate system was rolled out it was вЂњslow, uncertain and often chaoticвЂќ, вЂњultimately failed in its stated objective to prevent future lockdownsвЂќ, and вЂњseverely hampered the UKвЂ™s response to the pandemicвЂќ. The MPs said the governmentвЂ™s decision to halt mass testing in March 2020 вЂ“ days after the World Health Organization called for вЂњpainstaking contact tracing and rigorous quarantine of close contactsвЂќ вЂ“ was a вЂњserious mistakeвЂќ. вЂњWe must conclude that no formal evaluation took place, which amounts to an extraordinary and negligent omission given KoreaвЂ™s success in containing the pandemic, which was well publicised at the time,вЂќ the report says. While Public Health England told the MPs it had formally studied and rejected the South Korean approach, no evidence was provided despite repeated requests. The report questions why international experts were not part of the UK scientific advisory process and why measures that worked in other countries were not brought in as a precaution, as a response was hammered out.

The вЂњimpossibilityвЂќ of suppressing the virus was only challenged, the MPs say, when it became clear the NHS could be overwhelmed. Government preparations for a pandemic focused on influenza, вЂthe wrong type of diseaseвЂ™ MPs said. вЂњThat if you donвЂ™t have the prospect of a vaccine being developed, if you think people wonвЂ™t obey instructions to lockdown for very long, and have a wholly inadequate ability to test, trace and isolate people, that is what you are left with.вЂќ вЂњIt was more a reflection of fatalism,вЂќ Clark said. Greg Clark, the chair of the science and technology committee, said he dismissed the allegation that government policy sought to reach вЂњherd immunityвЂќ through infection but the outcome came to be seen as the only viable option. Some of the most serious early failings, the report suggests, resulted from apparent groupthink among scientists and ministers which led to вЂњfatalismвЂќ.

#ONE CLICK POLITICS TRIAL#

It celebrates some aspects of the UKвЂ™s Covid response, in particular the rapid development, approval and delivery of vaccines, and the world-leading Recovery trial that identified life-saving treatments, but is highly critical of other areas. The report from the Commons science and technology committee and the health and social care committee draws on evidence from more than 50 witnesses, including the former health secretary Matt Hancock, the governmentвЂ™s chief scientific and medical advisers, and leading figures from the vaccine taskforce and NHS Test and Trace. In a pandemic spreading rapidly and exponentially, every week counted.вЂќДecisions on lockdowns and social distancing during the early weeks of the pandemic вЂ“ and the advice that led to them вЂ“ вЂњrank as one of the most important public health failures the United Kingdom has ever experiencedвЂќ, the report concludes, stressing: вЂњThis happened despite the UK counting on some of the best expertise available anywhere in the world, and despite having an open, democratic system that allowed plentiful challenge.вЂќД 6:42 How the UK government sidestepped the data on coronavirus вЂ“ video explainer вЂњIt is now clear that this was the wrong policy, and that it led to a higher initial death toll than would have resulted from a more emphatic early policy. It was a deliberate policy вЂ“ proposed by official scientific advisers and adopted by the governments of all of the nations of the UK,вЂќ the report says. вЂњThis slow and gradualist approach was not inadvertent, nor did it reflect bureaucratic delay or disagreement between ministers and their advisers.

Boris Johnson did not order a complete lockdown until 23 March 2020, two months after the governmentвЂ™s Sage committee of scientific advisers first met to discuss the crisis.

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